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Abstract
Ten percent of all spending by the federal government is lost
due to fraud. As a result, in 1986, Congress began a course of
strengthening the False Claims Act (“FCA”) in order to wage war
on fraud committed against the government. However, certain
loopholes existed that allowed companies to retain government
funds they knew they were not entitled to keep because they still
did not fall within one of the FCA’s liability provisions. Although
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the FCA contained a so-called “reverse false claim” provision to
require the repayment of wrongfully retained government funds, it
fell short in reaching all instances of fraudulently retained funds
because it still mandated proof of the use of false statements or
records to retain the funds. In 2009, Congress sought to close this
loophole by adding a new provision that did away entirely with the
use of any false claim, record, or statement. This amendment was
designed to be a game-changer because its purpose was to ensure
that all fraudulent schemes are covered by the FCA.
This Article analyzes the effectiveness of this amendment by
conducting a systematic and comprehensive analysis of its
treatment by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that have
addressed it so far. Next, this Article identifies inconsistencies and
areas where there is a strong need for a uniform framework in order
to ensure that the government’s most important anti-fraud tool is
given its full and proper meaning. In addition, this Article tackles
the hot button topic of statistical sampling and explains why it is
permitted under this amendment. This Article also ties everything
together by providing an example of applying the revised provision
to a common Medicare fraud scheme. Finally, this Article includes
a section restating the entire practice and procedure for the revised
reverse false claims provision in order to guide the courts and
practitioners in applying it.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ten percent of all government spending is lost due to fraud.1
As a result, in 1986, Congress began a course of strengthening the
False Claims Act (“FCA”) to wage war on fraud against the
government.2 Although the Supreme Court proclaimed that the
FCA is intended “to reach all types of fraud, without qualification,
that might result in financial loss to the Government,”3 courts also
recognized that the plaintiff must allege and prove a specific
violation of the FCA (instead of simply alleging a fraudulent
scheme).4 Because each of the liability provisions included in the
1. Joel D. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception" to the False
Claims Act's "Public Disclosure Bar" in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U.
RICH. L. REV. 991 (2017) (“As much as 10 percent of every dollar spent on
government programs is lost to fraud.”). Accord William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1701, 1829 (1999) (“The General Accounting Office estimated in 1992
that Medicare fraud represented nearly ten percent of program expenditures.”
(citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: VULNERABLE
PAYERS LOSE BILLIONS TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 1 (1992))).
2. The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2018), is the
government’s most important anti-fraud tool. Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
3. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
4. United States. ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220,
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1986 modernized version of the FCA required some form of the
presentment or use of a false claim, record or statement,5 judges
started pronouncing that “an actual false claim is the sine qua non
of an FCA violation.”6 Thus, courts were reluctant to allow the
government to use this powerful tool in every instance of fraud;
instead, they required the government to tie fraudulently-obtained
funds to specific false claims or records.7 Therefore, from 1986
through 2009, certain loopholes existed whereby companies could
retain government funds they were not entitled to keep because
they did not fall within one of the FCA’s liability provisions.8
In 2009, Congress closed a major loophole by introducing the
first liability provision that no longer required proof of any type of
a false claim, record, or statement.9 Thus, the adage that a false
claim is the sine qua non of an FCA violation is no longer true, at
least with respect to the 2009 version of the so-called reverse false
claim provision. Today, the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) reaches
every kind of fraud scheme, provided that the plaintiff can establish
the defendant knows it is retaining government funds it is not
entitled to keep regardless of how it obtained them. Now, any
fraudulent scheme resulting in a company knowingly retaining
funds is covered by the FCA, and there is no need to tie the funds to
any initial claim for payment or the use of any false record or
statement to retain them. Thus, the government can use its most
powerful anti-fraud tool (the FCA) to recoup federal funds lost to
any fraudulent scheme resulting in a person retaining government
funds. Examples of this include seeking treble damages and relying

225 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Not all fraudulent conduct gives rise to liability under the
FCA. ‘[T]he statute attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity
or to the government's wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment.’
Evidence of an actual false claim is ‘the sine qua non of a False Claims Act
violation.’” (citation omitted)). Such cases were based on the 1986 version of the
FCA.
5. Id.
6. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011).
7. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220,
225 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, a defendant violates the FCA only when he or
she has presented to the government a false or fraudulent claim, defined as ‘any
request or demand . . . for money or property’ where the government provides
or will reimburse any part of the money or property requested. 31 U.S.C. §
3729(c); see also [Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776,
785(4th Cir. 1999)] (‘The False Claims Act at least requires the presence of a
claim—a call upon the government fisc—for liability to attach.’).”).
8. Id.
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc.,
120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Prior to the 2009 amendments, the
reverse false claims provision left a ‘loophole’ that excused from liability the
concealment, avoidance, or decreasing of an obligation to return to the
Government ‘money or property that is knowingly retained by a person even
though they have no right to it.’ S. Rep. 111–10, 13–14, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430,
441.”).
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upon statistical sampling.10
This Article addresses each of the legal and procedural
principles applicable to the 2009 amendment to § 3729(a)(1)(G),
often addressed as either “the reverse false claim provision” or
“Subsection G.” Section I introduces the issues. Section II outlines
the pertinent FCA provisions. Section III addresses the meaning of
the 2009 version of Subsection G, including why it does not require
proof of any false claim, record, or statement, and why it reaches all
types of fraud schemes whenever the plaintiff can show that the
defendant knows it is not entitled to retain the government funds.
It also includes a discussion and analysis of each of the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals (“Circuit Courts”) that have
addressed this provision. Section IV argues why statistical
sampling can be used to prove both liability and the amount of
damages. Section V contains a common example of Medicare
overpayment and applies the 2009 version of Subsection G to this
situation. Section VI restates the practices and procedures of
Subsection G to guide the courts and practitioners. Section VII
consists of the conclusion.

II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act was enacted by President Abraham
Lincoln in 1863 to combat rampant fraud against the military
during the Civil War.11 “Overnight, the qui tam12 provisions of the
FCA became the government's best weapon for combating fraud
against the government.”13 Unfortunately, in 1943, Congress
tinkered with the FCA in the wrong direction, to the point where
the FCA became seldom used and sat idle for four decades.14 In
1986, due to rising fraud, Congress revitalized and modernized the
FCA; as a result, once again it became the government’s most
10. See infra Sections V(B)(providing an example of obtaining treble
damages under the FCA for Medicare fraud), IV (discussing the need for
sampling and why it is permitted under the FCA).
11. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5273. “The False Claims Act of 1863 was adopted during the Civil War in order
to combat fraud and price-gouging in war procurement contracts.” United
States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994). The FCA is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33.
12. The FCA permits a private individual to bring an action on behalf of the
federal government and share in the recovery. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
13. Joel D. Hesch, It Takes Time: The Need to Extend the Seal Period for Qui
Tam Complaints Filed Under the False Claims Act, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 901,
904 (2015).
14. Id. (“One of the biggest mistakes occurred in 1943 when Congress limited
the filing of qui tam suits if they were ‘based upon information in the possession
of the government.’ Because this restricted the availability of recoveries, the
number of qui tam suits dried up immediately and fraud against the
government flourished. In fact, from 1943 until 1986, there were only six qui
tam suits brought per year.”).
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important anti-fraud tool.15 The four most commonly used FCA
liability provisions contained in the 1986 version of the FCA that
render a person liable are as follows:16
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E),
(F), or
*****
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government, . . . .17

Subsection G was first added to the FCA in 1986.18 It became
known by the courts as a reverse false claim because liability is
based upon an obligation to return government funds.19 At the time
of enactment, each of these provisions required both knowledge and
some form of a false claim, record, or statement.20 The FCA defines
“knowing” as follows:
(1) the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’—
(A) mean that a person, with respect to information—
(i) has actual knowledge of the information;
(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information;
15. Avco, 884 F.2d at 622 (“The False Claims Act is the government's
primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as the result of fraud
against the government.”).
16. See CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT § 4:1 (3rd ed. 2016) (discussing that only four of the provisions
are regularly used). Subsection G was first added in 2009. Id.
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1986). If there is a violation, the FCA
provides that such person “is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890, Pub. L.
No. 104-410 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2461 note), plus 3 times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.” Id.
When the FCA was amended in 2009, the liability sections were renumbered
from (a)(1)-(7) to (a)(1)(A)-(G).
18. SYLVIA, supra note 16. Subsection G was first added in 2009. Id. See also
supra note 17 (describing the statute’s renumbering).
19. The so-called “reverse false claims” got its name because “[t]hese claims
reverse the typical claim under the Act: instead of creating liability for
wrongfully obtaining money from the government, the reverse-false-claims
provision creates liability for wrongfully avoiding payments that should have
been made to the government.” United States ex rel. Barrick v. ParkerMigliorini Int'l, LLC, 878 F.3d 1224, 1226 (10th Cir. 2017).
20. See infra notes 25-26.

466

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

and
(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud.21

The FCA was amended in 2009 as part of an effort to broaden
its reach and close certain loopholes. One significant change was
the inclusion of a new liability provision tucked into Subsection G.
This amendment created a separate way of establishing liability,
whenever a person “knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.”22 Congress included a
definition of the term obligation in the 2009 amendment as follows:
For purposes of this section— . . . the term ‘obligation’ means an
established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or
implied
contractual,
grantor-grantee,
or
licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or
regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment[.]23

The 2010 Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) also stated that a
violation of the Medicare repayment provision—requiring
repayment of Medicare overpayments within sixty days—
constitutes an “obligation” under the FCA.24
The next section fully explores the meaning and application of
the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G).

III. UNDERSTANDING § 3729(A)(1)(G)
Section § 3729(a)(1)(G) is unique and has a far different
approach and reach than the other FCA liability sections. In 1986,
Congress first included the so-called “reverse false claim” provision
in Subsection G.25 In its initial form, it allowed the government to
collect treble damages if a person used a false record or statement
material to an obligation to pay the government.26 Because of this
understanding, courts ruled that the 1986 version of the reverse
false claim provision required the submission of a false claim.27 This
meant that all of the liability provisions included in the 1986
version of the FCA were tied to a false claim, record, or statement,
and this interpretation gave rise to general statements such as “an

21. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(b)(1)(A)-(B).
22. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009) (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 3729(b)(3) (2009) (adding a definition of the term obligation).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2018). The ACA also defined the term
overpayment for purposes of recovery under that statute, as follows: “The term
‘overpayment’ means any funds that a person receives or retains under
subchapter XVIII or XIX to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is
not entitled under such subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(B) (2018).
25. E.g., Kane, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 379-80 (discussing history of the FCA and
ACA).
26. Id.
27. Supra notes 4-7.
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actual false claim is the sine qua non of an FCA violation.”28
Therefore, the 1986 version of the FCA left a loophole with respect
to FCA liability. The FCA seemingly missed extending liability to
cover the concealment of an obligation to return funds to the
government when no false claim, record, or statement could
otherwise be established.29 For instance, a company may not have
been aware at the time that it was not entitled to government funds.
Thus, the knowing element may be missing; however, later the
company may realize that it should not have obtained the funds. In
those settings, the company’s retention of funds may not technically
fall within any of the 1986 FCA liability provisions, despite the
company knowing that it was not entitled to keep the funds.30
In 2009, Congress closed this loophole in order to permit the
FCA to be a tool in recovering all funds that are knowingly retained
by the defendant.31 When Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (“FERA”), it added a new liability provision to
Subsection G of the FCA.32 This new provision extends FCA liability
to the concealment of obligations to return funds without the need
to prove a false claim to obtain the funds or the use of a false record
to retain them.33 The 2009 amendment imposes liability if a person
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
[g]overnment.”34
As of 2009, there are now two separate liability provisions
within § 3729(a)(1)(G). Each provision requires its own analysis.
The first liability provision within § 3729(a)(1)(G), added in 1986,
renders a person liable if she “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement material to an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.”35 Thus, this provision requires a false record or
statement, much like the requirements of § 3729(a)(1)(B). The
second liability provision within § 3729(a)(1)(G), added in 2009,
specifically did away with the tying of a violation to any false claim,
record, or statement to obtain or retain the funds. As more fully

28. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1055.
29. Kane, 120 F. Supp. 3d at, 379-80.
30. SYLVIA, supra note 16, § 4:16 (“The new language was intended to
express the Committee's view that since 1986, the term obligation has included
a range of obligations, from fixed obligations to pay to situations where the
relationship between the Government and the person gives rise to a duty to pay,
regardless of whether the amount is fixed.”). That does not mean it can keep the
funds, but simply that the FCA may not be the vehicle to require repayment.
The government may still recoup the funds but not seek treble damages under
the FCA.
31. See supra notes 9 and 30.
32. See infra note 43.
33. See infra Section III(A).
34. § 3729(a)(1)(G)(1986).
35. § 3729(a)(1)(G)(2009).
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addressed below, merely knowingly retaining funds gives rise to
FCA liability under the 2009 amendment. There is no added
requirement of tying guilty knowledge to a false claim, record, or
statement.

A. The 2009 Amendment Removed any False Claim
Requirement
In conjunction with the full FCA, the 2009 version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) reads:
any person who . . . knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty . . . , plus 3 times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that
person.36
*****
For purposes of this section—. . . the term ‘obligation’ means an
established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or
implied
contractual,
grantor-grantee,
or
licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or
regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment[.]37

Just one year later, Subsection G was referred to and modified
by another statute enacted by Congress in the area of Medicare
fraud. In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),38
which requires a person who has received an overpayment of
Medicare or Medicaid to report and return the overpayment within
sixty days.39 The pertinent portion of the ACA reads:
If a person has received an overpayment, the person shall—
(A) report and return the overpayment to the Secretary, the State, an
intermediary, a carrier, or a contractor, as appropriate, at the correct
address; and
(B) notify the Secretary, State, intermediary, carrier, or contractor to
whom the overpayment was returned in writing of the reason for the
overpayment.
(2) Deadline for reporting and returning overpayments
An overpayment must be reported and returned under paragraph (1)
by the later of—
(A) the date which is 60 days after the date on which the overpayment
was identified; or

36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 3729(b)(3)(2009).
38. See infra note 43.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2020).
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(B) the date any corresponding cost report is due, if applicable.40

In short, Congress enacted a law that created a duty for those
receiving an overpayment of Medicare or Medicaid to report and
return the overpayment within sixty days. Thus, the government
could recoup overpayments. Moreover, the ACA specifically stated
that this duty also constitutes an “obligation” under the 2009
version of § 3729(a)(1)(G).41 This allows FCA liability to attach if
FCA knowledge is proven. The ACA specifically provides:
Any overpayment retained by a person after the deadline for
reporting and returning the overpayment under paragraph (2) is an
obligation (as defined in section 3729(b)(3) of Title 31) for purposes of
section 3729 of such title.42

Thus, as of at least May 22, 2010,43 the ACA and FCA work in
tandem to create a duty to repay Medicare overpayments within
sixty days and ensure that FCA liability exists for knowingly
retaining overpayments without needing to establish that the
defendant submitted a false claim or used a false record or
statement.44 It is sufficient for a FCA violation that the person
knowingly retained Medicare or Medicaid funds once he or she
knew that he or she had an obligation to return them.45

B. The Circuit Courts of Appeals’ Treatment of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G)
This section discusses the Circuit Courts’ treatment of the 2009
40. See supra note 24.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(3) (2020).
42. Id. The ACA also defined the term overpayment for purposes of recovery
under that statute, as follows: “The term ‘overpayment’ means any funds that
a person receives or retains under subchapter XVIII or XIX to which the person,
after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled under such subchapter.” Id. §
1320a-7k(d)(4)(B) (2020).
43. See U.S. v. San Bernardino Mountains Cmty. Hosp. Dist., No. EDCV 1700002 JGB (KKx), 2018 WL 5266866, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“Section 3729 was
amended on May 20, 2009 by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (‘FERA’)
of 2009. However, the 60-day deadline for reporting and returning
overpayments went into effect on March 23, 2010 under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2009 (‘PPACA’).”). Accordingly, the ACA applies to
“alleged misconduct prior to May 22, 2010 as grounds for
his reverse false claim.” Id.
44. Joel D. Hesch & Mia Yugo, Can Statistical Sampling Be Used to Prove
Liability Under the FCA or Does Each Provision of the Statute Require
Individual Proofs?, 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 335, 363–64 (2017). As far as timing
goes, “Section 3729 was amended on May 20, 2009 by the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (“FERA”) of 2009. However, the 60-day deadline for reporting
and returning overpayments went into effect on March 23, 2010 under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 (‘PPACA’).” San
Bernardino, 2018 WL 5266866 at *8. Accordingly, the ACA applies to “alleged
misconduct prior to May 22, 2010 as grounds for his reverse false claim.” Id.
45. See supra notes 9 and 30 and surrounding text.
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version of § 3729(a)(1)(G). Before jumping into the Circuit Courts
cases, however, a 2015 United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York case is instructive.46 In Kane ex rel.
United States. v. Healthfirst, Inc., the defendant discovered a
computer glitch that made it clear that it had overbilled Medicare.47
The discovery of this glitch occurred long after the defendant
submitted claims for reimbursement under Medicare.48 At the time
of the payment requests, however, the defendant did not possess the
requisite scienter to establish a FCA claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A) or
(B).49 The ACA required that, once the defendant discovered the
overpayment, it return the funds within sixty days.50 After
conducting an exhaustive analysis of the 2009 FCA and 2010 ACA,
the court held that once the defendant learned of the computer
glitch, it had an obligation to return the funds under both the ACA
and the FCA.51 There was no need for the plaintiff to allege a false
claim or false record or statement to satisfy the 2009 version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G).52 Thus, although the defendant may not have had
the requisite intent to violate § 3729(a)(1)(A) or (B) at the time it
submitted claims for payment, it would be liable under §
3729(a)(1)(G) for knowingly retaining funds it was obligated to
return.53 This is because, under the 2009 FCA and the 2010 ACA,
once the defendant knew it was not entitled to keep the funds, it
was obligated to return them.
Several Circuit Courts have addressed the 2009 version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G). As discussed below, those courts that have
conducted a detailed analysis of § 3729(a)(1)(G) have concluded that
it contains two separate liability provisions, and the provision
added in 2009 does not require the submission of a false claim,
record, or statement. Unfortunately, in a case without much
discussion or analysis, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) simply lumped together both
of the 1986 and 2009 liability provisions within § 3729(a)(1)(G) and
held that Subsection G requires a false claim, record, or
statement.54 The court failed to conduct a detailed analysis of the
46. Kane, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 377-78.
49. Id. at 390
50. Id. at 381 (“More simply stated, the ACA provides that any person who
has received an overpayment from Medicare or Medicaid and knowingly fails to
report and return it within sixty days after the date on which it was identified
has violated the FCA.”).
51. Id. at 388 (“Here, after the Comptroller alerted Defendants to the
software glitch and approached them with specific wrongful claims, and after
Kane put Defendants on notice of a set of claims likely to contain numerous
overpayments, Defendants had an established duty to report and return
wrongly collected money.”).
52. Id. at 377-78
53. Id.
54. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 333 (9th Cir.
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2009 amendment, which clearly eliminated the requirement of
establishing a false claim, record, or statement.55 This created
confusion within the Ninth Circuit as to whether the alternative
provision within the 2009 amendment somehow requires a false
claim, record, or statement simply because the alternative 1986
provision still requires a false claim, record, or statement.56
In 2016, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) faced the issue of whether the 2009
version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) requires a false claim.57 The court
undertook a detailed analysis of the 2009 FCA amendment and held
that the new provision does not require a false claim or any proof of
a false record or statement.58 The court described it this way:
In 2009, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(“FERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), which omitted
the requirement that a defendant “mak[e], us[e], or caus[e] to be
made or used, a false record or statement” from the relevant part of
the reverse-false-claim provision. Under the current version of the
FCA, anyone who “knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government”
is civilly liable.59

The same court in another case also stated: “An obligation
includes ‘the retention of any overpayment,’ 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3),
and the current version of the statute makes clear that ‘there is no
longer a need to show the affirmative use of a false record or
statement in connection to the avoidance of an obligation to pay
money to the United States,’ . . . so the knowing retention of an
overpayment is enough.”60
2017) (quoting simply older cases, including Cafasso, and applying the prior
version of the statute that required an actual false claim, without discussion or
acknowledgement of the 2009 amendments). This case is discussed in detail
infra notes 62-64, 66-72, and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 335–36
56. Id. This case is discussed in detail infra notes 62-64, 66-72 and
accompanying text.
57. United States ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy
Dist. (Harper I), 842 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012)). In 2018, the court revisited
the case in United States ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy
Dist. (Harper II), 739 F. App'x 330, 333 (6th Cir. 2018) (reiterating that the 2009
version of the “reverse-false-claim provision of the FCA subjects to liability any
person who ‘knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.’”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 798, 202 L. Ed. 2d 572 (2019). In Harper
II, the Ninth Circuit also reiterated that “knowing” under this provision, “must
be interpreted to refer to a defendant’s awareness of both an obligation to the
United States and his violation of that obligation” and that the relator failed to
allege the defendants had requisite knowledge that its leases violated the deed
restrictions. Id.
58. Harper I, 842 F.3d at 436.
59. Id.
60. United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.,
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Other Circuit Courts agreed. In 2016, three other Circuit
Courts reached similar conclusions. The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 2009 provision
simply requires that the person “knowingly and improperly avoids
an obligation to pay the United States.”61 The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly stated, “[t]he plain
text of the [2009] FCA's reverse claims provision is clear: any
individual who ‘knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government’ may be subject to liability.”62 The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also
acknowledged that there is no claim requirement and stated that
“subsection (a)(1)(G) at issue prohibits persons from knowingly
concealing an obligation to pay money to the government.”63
838 F.3d 750, 774 (6th Cir. 2016). Cf. United States ex rel. Crockett v. Complete
Fitness Rehab., Inc., 721 F. App'x 451, 459 (6th Cir. 2018) (“In a reverse-falseclaims case, a relator must show ‘an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government’ that is ‘avoid[ed] or decrease[d]’ through ‘a false
record or statement.’ 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).”). The Crockett court focused its
attention to the lack of any factual specificity in finding that the entire
complaint should be dismissed under Rule 9(b). Id. Thus, courts should not treat
this case as replacing the specific ruling in Harper II that the 2009 FCA did
away with any requirement of proving a false claim, record, or statement under
the 2009 version of Subsection G. Indeed, the Crockett court did not even cite
Harper II in its decision.
61. United States ex rel. Simoneaux v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 843
F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 2016) (Although “a person is liable under the
reverse-FCA provision if he knowingly and improperly avoids an obligation to
pay the United States,” it is not sufficient that the defendant avoided a potential
fine by not reporting to the EPA an environmental violation.). In a prior case,
the Fifth Circuit dismissed the claim because the plaintiff did not prove that
the defendant had an obligation to refund the money. United States ex rel. Guth
v. Roedel Parsons Koch Blache Balhoff & McCollister, 626 F. App'x 528, 534
(5th Cir. 2015). See also United States ex rel. Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP v.
BASF Corp., 929 F.3d 721, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (concluding that contingent
exposure to penalties for environmental violations does not amount to an
obligation under the reverse false claim provision).
62. United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations v. Victaulic Co., 839
F.3d 242, 254 (3d Cir. 2016). The court also stated, “In the pre-FERA FCA, a
false statement or record was a necessary element for reverse FCA liability to
attach. A false statement is no longer a required element, since the post-FERA
FCA specifies that mere knowledge and avoidance of an obligation is sufficient,
without the submission of a false record, to give rise to liability.” Id. at 255. The
Third Circuit issued three other decisions. Although not affirmatively stating
that there was not a claim requirement, it never once suggested that it was a
requirement. United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746,
764 (3d Cir. 2017) (alleged violation not material); United States ex rel. Petras
v. Simparel, Inc., 857 F.3d 497, 506–07 (3d Cir. 2017) (plaintiff unable to satisfy
the obligation requirement); United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc.,
855 F.3d 481, 492 (3d Cir. 2017) (dismissing all FCA claims because the fraud
was against a third party, not the government).
63. Olson v. Fairview Health Servs. of Minnesota, 831 F.3d 1063, 1074 (8th
Cir. 2016). The court affirmed dismissal of the case because there was no
showing that the defendant knew it owed the money back to the government.
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In December 2017, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that there is no false claim requirement
in the 2009 amendment and referred to this new provision as
follows:
The reverse-false-claims provision now imposes liability on any
person who: [1] knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government, or [2] knowingly
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (bracketed numbers added for
clarity). This second route to liability expands on the first by not
requiring a “false record or statement.” Simply “knowingly and
improperly avoid[ing] . . . an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government” is enough.64

In 2017, the First Circuit also referred to the 2009 provision as
one which “imposes liability on anyone who ‘knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
. . . money . . . to the Government.’ 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The
term ‘obligation’ is defined by the statute as ‘an established duty,
whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual
. . . relationship.’ Id. § 3729(b)(3).”65
The only Circuit Court case that created confusion was the
Ninth Circuit’s in Kelly. In Kelly, the court dismissed all FCA
claims, including the reverse false claim allegations, because the
relator did not allege a false claim or have proper support for the
FCA violations alleged in her Complaint.66 In dismissing the
reverse false claim allegations, the Ninth Circuit simply quoted the
full language of § 3729(a)(1)(G) without making a distinction
between the two separate liability components (i.e., the 1986
liability provision and the 2009 liability provision both contained
within Subsection G). According to the court:
That FCA provision, known as the “reverse false claims” provision,
creates liability for one who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
Simply because the government ultimately determined that the defendant’s
children's unit did not qualify as a children's hospital did not automatically
render it a FCA violation. Id. at 1072. Instead, the relator needed to allege and
prove that the defendant knew that its hospital did not qualify to satisfy the
knowing requirement of the FCA. Id. The court ruled that the defendant lacked
the required scienter to establish concealment of an obligation. Id. at 1074.
64. Barrick, 878 F.3d at 1230 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012)).
However, the court noted that the FCA still required “an obligation to pay . . .
money . . . to the government,” which was not met simply by alleging that the
defendant illegally imported meat into the country. Id. at 1230-31.
65. United States ex rel. Booker v. Pfizer, Inc., 847 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir.
2017). The court affirmed dismissal because the CIA did not impose an
“obligation” under the FCA. Id.
66. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 335–36 (9th Cir.
2017).
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made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.” Id. “The ‘reverse false claims’ provision does not
eliminate or supplant the FCA’s false claim requirement . . .
.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1056.67

The problem with lumping together both alternative provisions
contained within § 3729(a)(1)(G) is that the pre-existing 1986
reverse false claim provision required proof of a false claim, whereas
the alternative liability provision added in 2009 does not.
Unfortunately, the Kelly court simply cited to a prior Ninth Circuit
case (Cafasso) that addressed pre-2009 conduct under the 1986
version of the FCA.68 In the Cafasso case, there were only
allegations for misconduct occurring prior to 2009; therefore, for all
of those allegations, the 1986 FCA applied.69 This helps explain why
Kelly quoted Cafasso for the old proposition that “an actual false
claim is the sine qua non of an FCA violation.”70 This adage is no
longer true in the context of Subsection G because the 2009
amendment to Subsection G did away with a false claim
requirement. Thus, the sparsely worded opinion did not
differentiate between the pre and post-2009 alleged misconduct or
whether it was specifically addressing the 1986 or 2009 version of
Subsection G in its opinion. Further, the court’s reference to Cafasso
was misplaced because it related only to the 1986 FCA, and the
Kelly decision failed to explain whether it was interpreting the 1986
FCA or the 2009 FCA.
Accordingly, the Kelly decision created confusion for United
States District Courts (“District Courts”) within the Ninth Circuit.71
67. Id.
68. Kelly, 846 F.3d at 336 (“The ‘reverse false claims’ provision does not
eliminate or supplant the FCA’s false claim requirement . . . .” ).
69. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1053 (“In early 2004, Cafasso became aware of what
she believed was a scheme to deprive the United States of its ATIRP rights to a
new invention.”).
70. Id. at 1055. Courts either applying the 1986 version of Subsection G or
misreading Cafasso post-2009 amendment have stated, “[i]n cases where a
plaintiff alleges a reverse false claim by claiming that the defendant
fraudulently overcharged the government and then failed to repay the
government, courts have consistently dismissed the [reverse FCA] claim as
redundant.” United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., No. CV 08-1885 BRO
(AGRx), 2017 WL 2713730, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017). However, this
proposition is no longer true. The 2009 version of Subsection G is a standalone
provision that does not require a false claim, record, or statement and therefore
can be the only FCA provision that applies to a person’s conduct.
71. Unfortunately, the lower courts within the Ninth Circuit are divided as
to whether to interpret Kelly as requiring a claim for the 2009 amendment. At
least one District Court has ruled that Kelly somehow imputes a false claim
requirement into all FCA claims, including the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G).
Scott v. Ariz. Ctr. for Hematology & Oncology PLC, No. CV-16-03703-PHXDGC, 2018 WL 1210903, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2018) (interpreting Kelly as

2021]

Understanding The Revised Reverse False Claims Provision

475

At no point, however, did the Kelly court acknowledge that there
are two liability provisions within Subsection G or that each
provision has different elements. In fact, the Kelly court did not
even mention the decisions by other Circuit Courts addressing the
2009 amendment. Specifically, the Kelly court failed to acknowledge
that the 1986 provisions require a false claim, while the 2009
amendment does not have any language suggesting—let alone
requiring—a false claim, record, or statement. Without even any
discussion of the second liability provision within § 3729(a)(1)(G),
the court summarily dismissed the relator’s entire suit which
contained allegations occurring both before and after 2009.72
It is hard to imagine that the court in Kelly really intended to
rule (without any discussion) that the 2009 FCA amendment to
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) somehow requires a false claim when this language
does not appear in the amended version of the statute. Indeed, the
Kelly court was also dismissing the entire suit for other reasons,
which explains why the Kelly court may not have been focused upon
the impact of lumping the entire set of allegations together and the
effect this could have upon the lower courts facing the 2009
amendment.73 The majority in Kelly determined that the plaintiff
was unable to satisfy the “materiality” requirement for any of its
FCA allegations; this was a significant reason for why the entire
case fell short.74 In dismissing the reverse false claims allegations,
the court said that, because the plaintiff’s other claims failed as a
matter of law, “so too does his ‘reverse false claims’ cause of
action.”75 Thus, Kelly can be understood as dismissing the entire
case because the plaintiff neither established “materiality” nor
proved the existence of a legal duty to return the funds—not
because the 2009 version of Subsection G required a false claim.76
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit was again presented with a reverse
false claims issue.77 This time, it went a step further and actually
recognized that Congress added a new liability provision to the FCA
in 2009.78 The Ninth Circuit in Anita Silingo stated that this new
adopting Cafasso’s false claim requirement under the pre-2009 version of the
FCA to apply also to the 2009 amendment). However, other District Courts
within the circuit appear to have read Kelly as limiting any false claim
requirement to pre-2009 conduct and to have adopted the reasoning of sister
circuits that have fully evaluated the issue and held that no claim is required
under the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G). United States ex rel. Poehling v.
UnitedHealth Grp., No. CV1608697MWFSSX, 2018 WL 1363487, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2018).
72. Kelly, 846 F.3d at 328.
73. Id. at 333-34 (relator having failed to establish materiality).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 336.
76. Arguably, then, the language referring to the reverse false claim
provisions is dicta and not controlling within the Ninth Circuit.
77. United States ex rel. Anita Silingo v. WellPoint, Inc., 904 F.3d 667, 676
(9th Cir. 2018).
78. Id.
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version of Subsection G “is designed to cover Government money or
property that is knowingly retained by a person even though they
have no right to it.”79
Unfortunately, just as in Kelly, the Ninth Circuit did not need
to discuss § 3729(a)(1)(G) in more detail because of other fatal flaws
in the relator’s Complaint. However, Anita Silingo is still
instructive and provides a basis for arguing that Kelly did not
intend to require a false claim, record, or statement for the 2009
amendment to § 3729(a)(1)(G). Indeed, in dismissing the allegations
under the 2009 amended reverse false claim provision, Anita
Silingo did not hint that a false claim is required under the second
liability provision within § 3729(a)(1)(G). In fact, Anita Silingo did
not even cite to Kelly. Unfortunately, the context of the Anita
Silingo case kept the discussion limited because the relator’s
complaint was deficient in other ways. Specifically, the Anita
Silingo court affirmed the dismissal of the reverse false claim
because the relator, having earlier abandoned the claim under
§ 3729(a)(1)(G), was unable to revive it on appeal.80 In short, it does
not appear that Kelly is controlling law in the Ninth Circuit on the
issue of whether a false claim is required under the post-2009
amendment. At worst, some lower courts misunderstood Kelly; at
most, the language is dicta.
In sum and substance, each of the Circuit Courts that have
undertaken an in-depth analysis of the 2009 amendment to §
3729(a)(1)(G) have consistently held that there is no false claim,
record, or statement requirement for liability to attach for
knowingly retaining overpayments.81 “All that is required is
evidence that there is a duty to repay overpayments and the

79. Id. at 13–14 (citing S. REP. NO. 111-10 (2009), reprinted in 2009
U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441).
80. Id.
81. As far as other circuits, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has not specifically addressed whether the 2009
version of the FCA or 2010 ACA eliminated the claim requirement because the
plaintiff could not establish an obligation. United States ex rel. Schneider v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, 878 F.3d 309, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also faced the reverse
false claim issue several times but, in each instance, did not need to reach the
issue of whether a claim was required because of other defects. United States
ex rel. Gelbman v. City of New York, 970 F. App’x 244, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2019)
(The complaint “does not plausibly allege that Defendants-Appellees had any
obligation to repay to the federal government any funds it received.”);
Grabcheski v. Am. Int'l Grp., 687 F. App'x 84, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2017) (not needing
to address the claim issue because the allegations did not satisfy the
“materiality” requirement); United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853
F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (not needing to address the claim issue because
dismissal was warranted under the first to file rule); United States ex rel.
Takemoto v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 674 F. App'x 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2017) (not
needing to address the claim issue because complaint did not meet Rule 8
pleading requirements).
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defendant had requisite scienter.”82 Although the Ninth Circuit in
Kelly did not find that there were two liability provisions, the
Court’s holding in Poehling showed that the court did not tie
liability to a specific false claim, and the case was dismissed for
other reasons.83 Thus, Kelly is not controlling on the issue of
whether the 2009 amendment somehow requires a false claim,
record, or statement when the statute itself is devoid of any such
requirement.

C. The Two Elements of the 2009 Version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G)
Even though a plaintiff does not need to identify or prove that
the defendant used a false claim, record, or statement, there are
still two elements that must be met. The 2009 version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) renders a person liable if she “knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the [g]overnment.”84 In short, the
2009 reverse false claim provision requires proof of two elements:
(1) an obligation to return government funds; and (2) requisite
knowledge that they must return such funds.85 Each element is
discussed below.
With respect to an obligation, the 2009 version of
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) contains a specific definition. According to the FCA,
the term “obligation” means an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantorgrantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, from a fee-based or similar
relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any
overpayment[.]86

82. Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 354-55 (2017). See also id. (“it is clear
from both a plain reading of the statute and circuit decisions that there is no
requirement that a plaintiff establish FCA liability under subsection (a)(1)(G)
by introducing proof of individual false statements or claims. All that is required
is evidence that there is a duty to repay overpayments and the defendant had
requisite scienter.”).
83. See supra note 79 and surrounding text.
84. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009).
85. See Gelbman, No. 18-3162, 2019 WL 5242326 at *4 (“[A] claim under §
3729(a)(l)(G) requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant had a
financial obligation to the federal government.”); Kasowitz, 929 F.3d at 727
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (Section 3729(a)(1)(G) makes “liable anyone who ‘knowingly
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government.’”); Harper II, 739 F. App'x at
333 (“[Section 3729(a)(1)(G)] must be interpreted to refer to a defendant’s
awareness of both an obligation to the United States and his violation of that
obligation.”) (citation omitted); United States ex rel. Roycroft v. Geo Grp., 722
F. App'x 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A claim under § 3729(a)(1)(G) requires a
relator to ‘allege facts that show defendants received overpayments from the
government and failed to refund those payments.’”).
86. § 3729(b)(3) (2009).
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Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was not
legally entitled to receive or retain the funds. Common ways of
establishing an obligation include contract provisions, statutes, and
regulations. One example of a statute creating a duty is the 2010
ACA, in which Congress created a legal duty for all Medicare
providers to report and return any Medicare overpayment within
sixty days.87 In this instance, Congress went a step further by
specifically stating that this duty also constitutes an “obligation”
under the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G).88
Again, however, the FCA’s definition is broadly written to
include any duty (expressed or implied) under the circumstances or
flowing from the relationship a person receiving funds has with the
government or an agent thereof. Thus, an obligation is not limited
to the Medicare context but includes any obligation to return
overpayments of any government funds wrongfully retained.89
Under the plain language of the FCA, it is sufficient if a person
knowingly retains overpayments. In short, any retention of funds
under any government contract or program is covered by the 2009
version of subsection G.90
With respect to the second element, the person must knowingly
conceal or avoid repaying some or all of the funds. The FCA itself
defines knowing or knowingly as follows:
(1) the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’—
(A) mean that a person, with respect to information—

87. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2009).
88. § 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(3) (2009). The ACA also defined the term overpayment
for purposes of recovery under that statute, as follows: “The term ‘overpayment’
means any funds that a person receives or retains under subchapter XVIII or
XIX to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled under
such subchapter.” § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(B).
89. Long before the 2009 amendment, the 1986 reverse false claim provision
has been applied in a variety of non-Medicare cases. For instance, the contract
required military contractor to return excessive parts to the government and
retention or private sale of such parts constituted a reverse false claim. United
States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 195 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). It also
applies when someone uses a false statement to secure services from the
government at a reduced rate, United States v. Am. Heart Research Found.,
996 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993), and underpaying mineral royalties to the
government, Kennard v. Comstock Res., 363 F.3d 1039, 1048 (10th Cir. 2004).
90. At the same time, courts have ruled that an obligation must be fixed and
certain, not contingent. Thus, courts have held that potential civil or criminal
fines that may have been imposed if the defendant had reported violations of
environmental laws violations do not constitute an obligation under this
provision. See Simoneaux, 843 F.3d at 1035-36 (Although “a person is liable
under the reverse-FCA provision if he knowingly and improperly avoids an
obligation to pay the United States,” it is not sufficient that the defendant
avoided a potential fine by not reporting to the EPA an environmental
violation.); Kasowitz, 929 F.3d at 727 (holding that contingent exposure to
penalties for environmental violations does not amount to an obligation under
the reverse false claim provision).
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(i) has actual knowledge of the information;
(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information;
and
(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud.91

Thus, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either had
actual knowledge or acted with deliberate ignorance or reckless
disregard of the truth, that it had an obligation to repay funds in its
possession. In simplest terms, the defendant meets the FCA
knowledge element once it becomes aware that it is not entitled to
retain the funds, even if at the time it obtained the funds it was
unaware or lacked knowledge that it was not entitled to them in the
first place. Because the focus is on the knowledge of the defendant
at any moment in time while retaining overpayments (instead of
knowledge when it first received the funds or efforts to use false
records to retain them), the plaintiff need not tie knowledge to a
particular claim for payment or any false record to keep from
repaying the funds.92 Rather, the plaintiff need only establish that,
within the statute of limitations period, the defendant had FCA
knowledge that it is in possession of funds of which it has an
obligation to return.
The next section addresses how to determine the amount of
funds that must be returned, which includes relying upon statistical
sampling.

IV. STATISTICAL SAMPLING IS PERMITTED TO PROVE THE
AMOUNT OF OVERPAYMENTS UNDER THE 2009 VERSION OF
§ 3729(A)(1)(G)
The use of statistical sampling in the context of Medicare was
borne out of necessity.93 To ensure that Medicare patients receive
prompt medical services, Congress chose a mechanism whereby
Medicare healthcare providers are reimbursed prior to the
government reviewing claimed expenses.94 To expedite the
91. §§ 3729(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2009).

92. See Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 350–51 (“There is no language in
the statute requiring ‘specific knowledge’ or ‘specific proof.’ For instance, the
statute does not say, ‘The relator must provide individual proofs for each and
every alleged claim,’ nor does it say, ‘Proof of knowledge requires proof of
specific knowledge of specific claims.’ In fact, it is already well-established law
that neither specific intent, nor specific knowledge is required under the FCA.”).
93. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016)
(recognizing “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is the only practicable
means to collect and present relevant data establishing a defendant’s liability”).
The same is true for large scale fraud cases outside of the Medicare context.
94. Rio Home Care, LLC v. Azar, No. 7:17-CV-116, 2019 WL 1411805, at *2
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processing of claims, Medicare contractors generally reimburse
providers for services before reviewing the medical records related
to the claims and verifying that the claims are valid.95 People often
refer to this practice as pay and chase.96 Because CMS pays all
claims and then evaluates if the claims are valid, there are “huge
amounts of Medicare overpayments.”97 After payments are made,
Medicare engages in a process of identifying and demanding
repayment of overpayments.98 An integral part of the process of
recouping overpayments is the use of statistical sampling. Indeed,
in 1986, CMS formally adopted and approved the use of statistical
sampling for determining the existence and amount of Medicare
overpayments.99 To ensure effectiveness, statutes and regulations
address the methodology used to ensure that the sampling plans
are reliable.100 Today, it is now settled law that the government may
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV M-17116, 2019 WL 1409733 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) (“Enormous numbers of
Medicare claims are submitted each year.”).
95. See John Balko & Assocs. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
555 F. App’x 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 42 C.F.R. § 405.922 (2014)
(explaining time frame for processing initial determinations).
96. Kinetic Concepts, 2017 WL 2713730, at *1 (“This system is referred to as
a ‘pay and chase’ system because Medicare accepts claims as being true
representations that the claim qualifies for reimbursement and later follows up
with the claimant if it is determined that the claim was not reimbursable.”).
97. John Balko, 555 F. App’x at 190 (“While this process provides faster
payments to providers, it also results in huge amounts of Medicare
overpayments.”).
98. Id. at 192; Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Price, 860 F.3d 335, 337
(“Congress created the Medicare Integrity Program through which the
Secretary contracts with private entities ‘for the purpose of identifying
underpayments and overpayments and recouping overpayments[.]’ See 42
U.S.C. § 1395ddd(a), (h)(1).”); see also Rio Home Care, 2019 WL 1411805, at *2
(“The Medicare Integrity Program established a procedure to review payments
made to providers to ‘increase the effectiveness of the [Medicare Program]
through cost avoidance, savings, and recoupments of fraudulent, wasteful, or
abusive expenditures.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(g)(1)(A)(iii). Payments initially
made by Medicare contractors ‘may then be audited by Zone Program Integrity
Contractors (‘ZPICs’). When a ZPIC identifies an overpayment, it notifies the
relevant [Medicare Administrative Contractor], which then issues a demand
letter to the provider.’ Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 886 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir.
2018) (footnote omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(g), (h).”).
99. Rio Home Care, 2019 WL 1411805, at *3 (“In a 1986 administrative
ruling, CMS approved the use of statistical sampling and extrapolation in
determining whether there has been an overpayment and in calculating the
total amount of any overpayment.”).
100. Id. (“It is now well-settled that ‘[e]xtrapolation is one permissible
method of calculating overpayments. In particular, Congress authorized
Medicare contractors to use extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts
if the Secretary determines that there is a sustained or high level of payment
error.’”)(quoting Maxmed, 860 F.3d at 337 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3)(A)
(2012)). CMS has developed guidelines for the use of statistical sampling and
extrapolation in estimating overpayments, which are found in its Medicare
Program Integrity Manual (‘MPIM’).”), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV M-17-116, 2019 WL 1409733 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019).
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rely upon statistical sampling to determine the amount of an
overpayment when recouping Medicare overpayments.101 Moreover,
there is a presumption that statistical sampling is valid,102 and
courts have rejected arguments that statistical sampling violates
due process.103
The following is an example scenario using statistical sampling
to determine the amount of an overpayment. Assume there is an
allegation that a hospital had a practice of upcoding certain
procedures whereby it treated Medicare patients for a cold but used
the higher billing code of pneumonia.104 Further, assume that the
hospital used the pneumonia billing code 10,000 times over the past
few years. To determine the amount of overpayment for patients
that were actually treated for a cold instead of pneumonia, CMS
would select a statistically valid subset of the 10,000 cases and
conduct an analysis of that sample to determine an error rate and
extrapolate it to the 10,000 claims.105 The hospital would be
required to repay overpayments based on this sampling.106
101. See Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 357 n.99 (citing Ill. Physicians
Union v. Miller, 675 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he use of statistical
samples has been recognized as a valid basis for findings of fact in the context
of Medicaid reimbursement”)); Chaves Cty. Home Health Servs. v. Sullivan, 732
F. Supp. 188, 190 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Chaves Cty. Home Health Serv.
v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
102. See Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 357 (citing Maxmed, 860 F.3d at
339).
103. See id. at 364 n.101 (citing Chaves, 931 F.2d at 919-22; Ratanasen v.
Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 11 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1993); Ill. Physicians Union,
675 F.2d at 157 (“[I]n view of the enormous logistical problems of Medicaid
enforcement, statistical sampling is the only feasible method available.”); Bend
v. Sebelius, No. 09-3250, 2010 WL 4852230, at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010)
(“The sample taken by the Carrier met the requirements of the Medicare
program and when combined with the inherently low risk of error and the
substantial government interest in statistical sampling, [plaintiff] has not
suffered a procedural due process violation in this case.”)).
104. This example is taken from Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 339–41.
105. “The calculation of the amount of the overpayment could be conducted
two ways: by reviewing all 10,000 Medicare patient charts, or through
statistical sampling, which requires reviewing a subset based upon
a sampling plan. When using sampling, the exact same analysis of a patient's
file would be conducted. For instance, a medical expert would review each of the
selected samples and determine if the notes had sufficient evidence to prove
that each patient was actually being treated for pneumonia, such as if X-rays
were done or certain pills prescribed. Once a rate of erroneous billing is set for
the sample, that ratio is applied to all 10,000 files. For example, if
the sampling reveals that 80% of the billings were improper for pneumonia,
that figure would correlate to 80% of the 10,000 billings being fraudulent.” Id.
at 340 (footnotes omitted).
106. Again, it is settled that this use of sampling is appropriate when CMS
performs an audit and is seeking overpayments. See supra notes 95-96; see also
Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 341–42 (“Because of the wide acceptance
of sampling and the impossibility of conducting claim-by-claim analysis in large
Medicare overpayment cases, courts have routinely endorsed relying upon
statistical sampling to recover Medicare overpayments, as well as in calculating
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Within the FCA, courts similarly accept that damages may be
calculated through statistical sampling.107 Recently, however, some
commentators have argued that sampling is not permissible to
prove liability under the FCA.108 One of the principle arguments
against the use of statistical sampling is “[b]ecause the [FCA]
attaches liability to each individual claim, the FCA requires
individual proof for each false claim.”109 With respect to at least the
2009 version of Subpart G, there are two reasons why this argument
is unavailing.
First, and foremost, the amended version of Subpart G does not
require proof of any false claim. As established above, in 2009,
Congress changed the landscape of the FCA by adding a new
liability provision that did away with any requirement to prove that
a defendant obtained funds through a false claim or the use of a
false statement or record to retain them.110 Under the 2009 version
of § 3729(a)(1)(G), a defendant is liable if it “knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the [g]overnment.”111 Thus, under
the 2009 version of Subpart G, determining the amount of

damages under the FCA.”). See also id. (“The only requirement is that
the sample must be fairly representative and statistically valid, which is a
factual issue determined in each case.”).
107. “[S]ampling has been widely recognized as legally permissible for
calculating damages under all provisions of the FCA.” Id. at 355 (citing United
States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., No. CA 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 WL
3903675, at *7–8 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015), order corrected, No. CA 0:12-3466JFA, 2015 WL 4128919 (D.S.C. July 6, 2015), and aff'd in part, appeal
dismissed in part, 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017) (gathering and discussing cases
that permit or reject sampling in FCA cases and rejecting sampling based upon
the factual difficulties in this particular case); U.S. v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 240 (D.P.R. 2000) (establishing that statistical sampling is
generally permitted for establishing damages and providing an overview of
cases that have permitted it); United States ex rel. Doe v. DeGregorio, 510 F.
Supp. 2d 877, 890 (M.D. Fla. 2007); United States ex rel. Harris v. Bernad, 275
F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2003) (allowing use of statistical sampling to determine
damages caused by the overpayment of Medicare reimbursements in FCA
case)).
108. See e.g., Peter T. Thomas, Trial by Formula: The Use of Statistical
Sampling and Extrapolation in Establishing Liability Under the False Claims
Act, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 215, 249-50 (2017)
(“[S]tatistical sampling cannot establish liability under the FCA.”); Patrick
Kennedy, Lies and Statistics: Statistical Sampling in Liability Determinations
Under the False Claims Act, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (2019) (“While this
Note largely focuses on the constitutional due process challenges of sampling,
there remains some doubt whether the FCA bars statistical sampling as a
statutory matter.”).
109. Thomas, supra note 108, at 249-50 (“Because the FCA requires an
individualized examination of each false claim, the FCA's liability requirements
‘cannot be replaced [with a] ‘Trial by Formula.’” (citations omitted)).
110. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009). See also supra Section III(A).
111. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009).
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overpayments is merely a function of damages.112 There is no need
to show that a person wrongfully requested or received the funds at
the time. There is similarly no need to tie the retention of the funds
to any particular false record or statement to conceal the wrongful
retention of the funds. Rather, all that is needed for FCA liability
under § 3729(a)(1)(G) is a showing that the person in possession of
government funds is not entitled to keep them — not that she
submitted a false claim to obtain them.113 Because the government
need not tie such duty to a particular false claim, record, or
statement, there is no need to rely upon any specific invoice or
record to determine liability.114 Accordingly, statistical sampling
may be used to determine the amount of overpayments under the
2009 version of §3729(a)(1)(G) because the sampling and
extrapolation is merely determining the amount of funds that must
be returned.115
Second, statistical sampling may be used to prove liability
under each provision of the FCA because the Act does not require
individual proofs. Although the FCA is often referred to as a fraud
112. The issue of whether sampling can be used to establish liability under
the FCA need not be resolved for determining the amount of a Medicare
overpayment under the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) because, in this context,
it is merely a function of calculating damages. Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at
348, 355. See also id. at 337, 348, 355 (arguing that sampling can be used to
establish FCA liability, but also noting that it is not necessary to reach that
determination regarding the 2009 amendment to Subsection G).
113. Id. at 363 (“This subpart did away with requiring the use of a false
statement and, with it, any argument that individual proof is required. Under
the 2009 version, all that is required is to show that there existed a duty or
obligation to repay funds.”).
114. Proof of liability is not established through any invoice, but by
testimony and other evidence of the defendant’s guilty knowledge, plus the basis
for the legal duty to return overpayments. Id. at 352 (“Thus, the proof of the
FCA’s level of intent to create a false claim does not come from the invoices or
even the statistical sampling itself; rather, the proof of the fraud scheme is
established through testimony of individuals together with memos, emails, or
other documents implementing the scheme itself. Once the scheme is
established, the role of sampling is to measure how far the scheme extended
and to approximate the harm and thus the amount to be repaid. There is neither
a requirement in the FCA nor, more importantly, a need for the government to
analyze each particular invoice or submitted claim. So long as the allegedly
fraudulent claims arise from the same scheme, the government need only prove
liability for the overall scheme, not the individual claim, in order to meet its
burden. [These authors] proffer that statistical sampling is the tool enabling it
to do so.”).
115. Id. at 358-59 (“[S]tatistical sampling is clearly allowed under subsection
(a)(1)(G) because there is no requirement that a false statement be used.
Rather, all that is required is that a defendant knowingly and improperly avoids
an obligation to pay money to the Government. The determination of the
amount of overpayments is considered a damages issue, for which calculation
the FCA permits the use of statistical sampling. Thus, the plaintiff may use
statistical sampling under (a)(1)(G)”). Again, it is well settled that recouping of
Medicare overpayments may be accomplished through statistical sampling. See
supra notes 87-88.
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statute, “[t]here is no language in the statute requiring ‘specific
knowledge’ or ‘specific proof.’”116 While it is true that most FCA
liability provisions contain some form of a false claim requirement,
i.e. § 3729(a)(1)(A)&(B),117 “the plaintiff need not prove the
defendant specifically intended to defraud the government in each
and every alleged instance of presenting or using a false claim for
payment. The absence of a specific intent requirement also means
the absence of a specific proof requirement.”118 Rather, the evidence
of a violation of the FCA is produced through testimony and other
evidence of the scheme itself.119 “The role of statistical sampling is
to determine the efficiency of the fraudulent scheme and serve as
the vehicle for measuring the extent of overpayments due to the
fraudulent scheme.”120 “So long as the allegedly fraudulent claims
arise from the same scheme, the government need only prove
liability for the overall scheme, not the individual claim, in order to
meet its burden.”121 In short, none of the liability provisions require
proof of specific claims.122 Thus, “the plaintiff need not show intent
for each and every alleged claim, but intent for the entire scheme.”
Accordingly, sampling is proper under Subpart G (as well as
§ 3729(a)(1)(A)&(B)), because “neither specific intent nor specific
knowledge is required under the FCA and the proof of the
fraudulent scheme is established through testimony of individuals
together with memos, emails, or other documents implementing the
scheme itself.”123
In sum, statistical sampling is appropriate in cases alleging

116. See id. at 350 (“To establish liability, the plaintiff must prove only:
“falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality.”).
117. “The FCA provides for liability if a person ‘knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,’, or
‘knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.’ United States ex rel. Tracy
Schutte v. Supervalue, Inc. et al., No. 11-3290, 2020 WL 3577996, at *6 (C.D.
Ill. July 1, 2020) (citation omitted).
118. Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 351.
119. Id. at 352 (“Thus, the proof of the FCA's level of intent to create a false
claim does not come from the invoices or even the statistical sampling itself;
rather, the proof of the fraudulent scheme is established through testimony of
individuals together with memos, emails, or other documents implementing the
scheme.”). See also id. (“In short, the invoices themselves are not the fraud, but
simply a byproduct of containing the overpayment due to the scheme. Thus, the
proof of the FCA's level of intent to create a false claim does not come from the
invoices or even the statistical sampling itself; rather, the proof of the fraudulent
scheme is established through testimony of individuals together with memos,
emails, or other documents implementing the scheme.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. See also id. (“Because there is no “specific intent” requirement,
however, statistical sampling clearly satisfies the burden of proof because the
plaintiff need not show intent for each and every alleged claim, but intent for
the entire scheme.”).
122. Id. at 350.
123. Id. at 353.
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violations of the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) because (1)
Congress totally eliminated the false claim requirement for Subpart
G, and thereby eliminated the argument that sampling is not
permissible based upon the need to prove particular false claims,124
and (2) there is no requirement under any of the FCA liability
provisions for individualized proof of specific intent or specific
knowledge.

V. A MEDICARE OVERPAYMENT EXAMPLE APPLYING
§ 3729(A)(1)(G)
Here is a hypothetical Medicare overpayment example to show
how to apply the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G):
Big Homecare, Inc. provides skilled care to those considered
homebound and seeks reimbursement under Medicare for eligible
patients. Jane Doe, an employee of Big Homecare, Inc., attends a
meeting in which the company instructs employees to bill Medicare
for services, regardless of whether patients are homebound, and
instructs employees to lie in the medical records about mobility to
give the false impression that patients were homebound. One-half of
the patients are not actually homebound and not eligible for skilled
care under Medicare, but the company bills Medicare for all Medicare
patients. The company was reimbursed by Medicare in the amount of
$100 million over the past 5 years for treating thousands of patients.
Jane Doe files a qui tam complaint. The government intervenes and
files its own complaint. The first count seeks recoupment under the
ACA for failing to report and return any Medicare overpayment
within sixty days. The second count alleges a violation of the 2009
version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the FCA because the defendant had
knowledge that it knowingly concealed or knowingly and improperly
avoided returning or repaying funds for patients that were not
homebound.

In this example, the government may recover the
overpayments from Big Homecare, Inc. under both the ACA and
FCA. Below is an explanation as to how a court should rule upon
each count in the complaint, beginning with count one seeking
recoupment under the ACA and followed by count two alleging a
violation of the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G) under the FCA.

124. None of the commentators listed in supra note 108 even address the
2009 Subpart G liability provision, let alone argue that this provision requires
individual proof or that sampling would be impermissible. In addition, there are
no reported decisions denying the use of statistical sampling in cases alleging
violations of the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G).
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A. The Government May Recoup Overpayments Under
the ACA.
To recoup the Medicare funds, the government must show that
there exists an obligation to return or repay the government funds.
Here, the government is relying upon a statutory duty under the
ACA requiring Big Homecare to report and return any Medicare
overpayment within sixty days.125 When recouping Medicare
overpayments, there is no requirement that the company had
knowledge that it was not entitled to either obtain or retain the
funds. Rather, the company must return funds if there was an
overpayment. Under the ACA, “[t]he term ‘overpayment’ means any
funds that a person receives or retains under subchapter XVIII or
XIX to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not
entitled under such subchapter.”126
Here, proof of an overpayment flows from several federal
statutes and regulations. First, to participate in Medicare, a
provider must sign and file a Provider Agreement with the
government promising compliance with applicable statutes,
regulations, and guidance.127 Second, Medicare only pays home
healthcare for patients who require skilled care if the patient is
certified as “homebound.”128 Third, Medicare only provides benefits
for medically necessary services rendered by eligible and
appropriately licensed providers. 129Therefore, Big Homecare
received overpayments because it received payment for patients
that were not homebound.
It is settled that the government may use statistical sampling
to determine the amount of overpayments under the ACA.130
Therefore, if a reliable sampling plan is implemented, courts will
order the company to repay the funds in an amount determined by
the sampling. In this case, the defendant was reimbursed by
Medicare for $100 million for treating thousands of patients.
Assume that the sampling plan confirmed the relator’s estimate
that half of the patients were not homebound by specifically
estimating under a valid sampling plan that 52% of the patients in
the sample were not homebound. Using extrapolation, the
defendant has an obligation to return 52% of the $100 million or $52

125. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2020).
126. § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(B) (2020).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2018).
128. 42 C.F.R. § 412.23(e)(1) (2020).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2018).
130. Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 357 (“[I]t is well settled that when the
government seeks the return of overpayments, such as under the ACA, it is
allowed to use statistical sampling to calculate the overpayments.”); Maxmed,
860 F.3d at 339 (allowing statistical sampling in Medicare cases); Ratanasen,
11 F.3d at 1471 (approving the use of random sampling in audits regarding
Medicare).
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million. Because statistical sampling is acceptable for recouping
Medicare overpayments, a court would rule in favor of the
government and order Big Homecare to pay $52 million.

B. The Government May Recover Treble Damages
Under the FCA.
To recover treble damages under § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the 2009
version of the FCA with respect to the overpayments, the
government must establish two elements: (1) an obligation to return
the government funds; and (2) the person knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids returning some or all of the funds.
The first element is the exact same element as recouping
overpayments under the ACA; therefore, this element is met in the
same manner. Under the 2009 amendment to Subsection G, the
relator may establish an obligation by relying upon,
an established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or
implied
contractual,
grantor-grantee,
or
licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or
regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment.131

Thus, the obligation may flow from any duty within a statute
or regulation, and specifically includes retention of an
overpayment.132 Congress also mandated in the ACA that the same
duty existing under the ACA for reporting and returning Medicare
overpayments within sixty days also constitutes an obligation
under the FCA.133 To satisfy the first element under the FCA, all
that is required is that the defendant currently possess funds to
which it has an obligation to return. The government would rely on
the same statutes and regulations as it did to establish an obligation
under the ACA.
Evidence that the first element is identical to proving an
obligation under the ACA is also found in the FCA. Indeed,
Congress amended § 3729(a)(1)(G) in 2009 to do away with any
requirement that the government prove a false claim for payment
to obtain the funds or use of any false record or statement to retain
the funds.134 All that is required under the first element is that the
defendant currently possesses funds it has an obligation to
return.135 Thus, there is no requirement to tie the obligation to any
particular invoice or claim to receive the funds in the first
instance.136 Instead, the first element is met if there is an obligation
131. § 3729(b)(3) (2009).
132. Id.
133. § 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(3) (2009).
134. See supra notes 9, 23, 34-35.
135. See supra notes 31-32, 73.
136. Id. Just like under the ACA discussed above, it is sufficient that the
government identify a scheme or procedure by which the defendant received
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to return any funds presently in the possession of a defendant.
The second FCA element requires the government to establish
that the person knowingly concealed or knowingly and improperly
avoided returning or repaying some or all of the funds.137 Thus, the
only difference between the ACA and FCA in recovering Medicare
overpayments is that the FCA also requires FCA scienter (i.e. proof
of knowledge that the defendant was improperly retaining the
funds or that it knew it had an obligation to return the funds and
retained them anyway).
The FCA allows the government to establish knowing or
knowingly in one of three ways: (1) actual knowledge of the
information; (2) deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or (3) reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information.138 Again, the FCA specifically did away with requiring
proof of any specific false claim (or any use of a false record or
statement). Thus, Congress did away with requiring any knowledge
of falsity on a claim-by-claim (or invoice-by-invoice) basis. Instead,
FCA knowledge may be established for the scheme or device used
to retain the overpayments.
In this example, there is evidence that the defendant had
guilty knowledge that it was improperly retaining the funds for
patients that were not homebound. This evidence is found in
testimony by employees of the company regarding the scheme as
well as documents showing knowledge. This element of FCA
knowledge is met if the government can show that the defendant
knew that patients were not homebound or acted with deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth regarding their
homebound status. The government need only prove that the
defendant knew it was retaining overpayments, but not necessarily
that it knew of each individual overpayment at the time the
defendant received the payments. As articulated in another law
review article by the author:
Because ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘reckless disregard’ are enough, a
defendant can be found liable for fraud even if all they did was
recklessly ignore the entire situation or bury their head in the
sand.71 Applying this standard to the issue of statistical sampling, we
can see that the plaintiff need not prove the defendant specifically
intended to defraud the government in each and every alleged
instance of presenting or using a false claim for payment. The absence
of a specific intent requirement, in other words, also means the
funds for services not entitled for Medicare reimbursement. Accordingly, by
proving that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of obtaining or
retaining funds to which it is not entitled to keep, the first element is met
without tying the amount of overpayment to a particular claim. Therefore, the
same analysis for establishing an obligation discussed above applies equally
here, and the government has met its burden of establishing an obligation to
return the funds.
137. See supra Section III(C).
138. §§ 3729(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2009).
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absence of a specific proof requirement.139
*****
If a particular liability provision does not require individual proofs,
then statistical sampling–assuming it was done properly–is always
permissible to show liability. Why? Because liability lies in the
fraudulent scheme, not the individual proofs.140

Because Congress did away completely with any requirement
to establish a false claim, record, or statement under the 2009
version of Subsection G, “statistical sampling clearly satisfies the
burden of proof because the plaintiff need not show intent for each
and every alleged claim, but intent for the entire scheme.
Extrapolation, when done properly, satisfies the burden because it
demonstrates the defendant's general intent to defraud the
government.”141
The previously mentioned law review article by the author
aptly articulates why sampling can be used to aid in proving
liability as well as establishing damages under the FCA, and in
particular the 2009 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G):
The role of statistical sampling is to determine the efficiency of the
fraudulent scheme and serve as the vehicle for measuring the extent
of overpayments due to the fraudulent scheme; . . . the proof of the
fraudulent scheme is established through testimony of individuals
together with memos, emails, or other documents implementing the
scheme . . . . So long as the allegedly fraudulent claims arise from the
same scheme, the government need only prove liability for the overall
scheme, not the individual claim, in order to meet its burden.142

Here, there is ample evidence of knowledge—both actual
knowledge and deliberate ignorance. The defendant had actual
knowledge of the fraud scheme itself, which set into motion the
retention of government funds for patients that were not
homebound. The fact that the defendant also may have known, at
the time it sought payment, that a large portion of the patients were
not homebound does not alter the fact that the defendant similarly
had knowledge that it was retaining funds it was not entitled to due
to patients not being homebound. Under the 2009 version of
Subsection G, the government must only prove that the defendant
knows that it is currently retaining funds it is not entitled to keep.
Thus, with respect to the second FCA element, once knowledge is
established, the only issue is the amount of the overpayments.
Because sampling may be used to establish damages, the
government should be awarded single damages of $52 million,
based upon the sampling. Under the FCA, this amount is then
trebled and the defendant would be required to pay $156 million.
139. Hesch & Yugo, supra note 44, at 351–52.
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id. at 352.
142. Id.
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VI. RESTATING § 3729(A)(1)(G)
Based on the authority and analysis cited in this Article, the
following is a restatement of the law and procedures pertaining to
the two liability provisions within § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the False
Claims Act (FCA).143

A. Section 3729(a)(1)(G)
Section 3729(a)(1)(G) of the False Claims Act, which has been
coined the “reverse false claim” provision, contains two separate
liability provisions.
First, under the 1986 version of § 3729(a)(1)(G), which is still
in existence, a person is liable if he or she “knowingly makes, uses,
or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material
to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.”144 This provision requires proof of a submission of a
false record or statement, similar to the requirements of
§ 3729(a)(1)(B).
Second, a person is liable under the 2009 amendment if she
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
[g]overnment.”145 In conjunction with the full FCA, the 2009 version
of § 3729(a)(1)(G) reads:
any person who . . . knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty . . ., plus 3 times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that
person.146
***
For purposes of this section—. . . the term “obligation” means an
established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or
implied
contractual,
grantor-grantee,
or
licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or
regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment[.]147

Under the 2009 amendment to § 3729(a)(1)(G), there is no
requirement of the submission of a false claim and no requirement
that a plaintiff establish any false record or statement.148 Liability
143. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. § 3729(b)(3) (2009).
148. See supra notes 9, 22-23, 34-35. The 2009 version of Subsection G is not
redundant to any other FCA liability provisions. It applies even if no other FCA
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under the 2009 amendment to § 3729(a)(1)(G) requires proof of two
elements: (1) an obligation to return government funds, and (2)
requisite knowledge that they must return such funds.
With respect to the first element, an obligation to return
overpayments, the FCA contains a specific definition of the term
“obligation.” According to the FCA,
the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not fixed,
arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or
licensor-licensee relationship, from a fee-based or similar
relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any
overpayment[.]149

A person is liable if they are not legally entitled to retain the
funds at the time of the suit. Common ways of establishing an
obligation include contract provisions, statutes and regulations.
With respect to the second element, a person knowingly
conceals or avoids repaying some or all of the funds, the FCA defines
knowing or knowingly, as follows:
(1) the terms ‘knowing” and ‘knowingly’—
(A) mean that a person, with respect to information—
(i) has actual knowledge of the information;
(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information;
and
(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud.150

The plaintiff must prove that the defendant either had actual
knowledge or acted with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard
of the truth that it had an obligation to repay funds currently within
its possession. A defendant has requisite knowledge once it becomes
aware that it is not entitled to retain the funds, even if at the time
it obtained them it lacked knowledge that it was not entitled to
them. The plaintiff need not tie knowledge to a particular claim for
payment. The plaintiff need only establish that, within the statute
of limitation period, the defendant had knowledge that it was
currently in possession of funds it was not entitled to retain.

B. Medicare Overpayments
In the Medicare context, in 2010, Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires a person who has
received an overpayment of Medicare or Medicaid to report and
liability provision applies, because, unlike other provisions, it does not require
proof of any false claim, record, or statement.
149. Id.
150. §§ 3729(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2009).
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return the overpayment within sixty days.151 The pertinent portion
of the ACA reads:
If a person has received an overpayment, the person shall–
(A) report and return the overpayment to the Secretary, the State, an
intermediary, a carrier, or a contractor, as appropriate, at the correct
address; and
(B) notify the Secretary, State, intermediary, carrier, or contractor to
whom the overpayment was returned in writing of the reason for the
overpayment.
(2) Deadline for reporting and returning overpayments
An overpayment must be reported and returned under paragraph (1)
by the later of–
(A) the date which is 60 days after the date on which the overpayment
was identified; or
(B) the date any corresponding cost report is due, if applicable.152

The ACA creates a duty for those receiving an overpayment of
Medicare or Medicaid to report and return the overpayment within
sixty days. The ACA also provides that this duty constitutes an
“obligation” under the FCA.153 The ACA reads:
Any overpayment retained by a person after the deadline for
reporting and returning the overpayment under paragraph (2) is an
obligation (as defined in section 3729(b)(3) of Title 31) for purposes of
section 3729 of such title.154

As of at least May 22, 2010,155 the ACA and FCA jointly create
a duty to repay Medicare or Medicaid overpayments within sixty
days, and a knowing failure to repay overpayments is a FCA
violation under § 3729(a)(1)(G).

151. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2010).
152. §§ 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(3) (2010). The ACA also defined the term
overpayment for purposes of recovery under that statute, as follows: “The term
‘overpayment’ means any funds that a person receives or retains under
subchapter XVIII or XIX to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is
not entitled under such subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(B) (2010).
153. § 1320a-7k(d)(1)-(3) (2010).
154. Id. The ACA also defined the term overpayment for purposes of recover
under that statute, as follows: “The term ‘overpayment’ means any funds that
a person receives or retains under subchapter XVIII or XIX to which the person,
after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled under such subchapter.” § 1320a7k(d)(4)(B) (2010).
155. See San Bernardino, 2018 WL 5266866 at *8 (“Section 3729 was
amended on May 20, 2009 by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (‘FERA’)
of 2009. However, the 60-day deadline for reporting and returning
overpayments went into effect on March 23, 2010 under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2009 (‘PPACA’).”). Accordingly, the ACA applies to
“alleged misconduct prior to May 22, 2010 as grounds for
his reverse false claim.” Id.
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C. Non-Medicare Overpayments
The 2009 amendment is not limited to Medicare overpayments.
Section 3729(a)(1)(G) also applies to knowingly retaining
overpayments, of any government funds, under any government
program. Regardless of the government program or funds, under
the 2009 amendment, the plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) an
obligation to return government funds; and (2) requisite knowledge
that it must return such funds.

D. Statistical Sampling is Permitted
Because there is no requirement to establish a false claim for
payment under the 2009 amendment to § 3729(a)(1)(G), it is not
necessary to tie an obligation to return overpayments to a particular
claim. Once a person has knowledge that she is not entitled to retain
the funds, FCA liability attaches. The plaintiff need not prove an
individual false claim as a part of liability. The amount of
repayment of the obligation is a function of damages. Statistical
sampling may be used to determine the amount of any
overpayment.

VII. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed and explained why the 2009 version of §
3729(a)(1)(G) of the FCA does not require proof of any false claim,
record, or statement. It also argued that this subsection now
reaches all types of fraud schemes whenever the plaintiff can show
the defendant knows it is not entitled to retain government funds,
regardless of whether it had FCA knowledge at the time it received
the funds or used any false record or statement to retain the funds.
This Article also discussed each of the few Circuit Courts that have
addressed Subsection G, and it distinguished the lone circuit court
of appeals case that contained language in one opinion that a few
lower courts incorrectly interpreted as requiring proof of a false
claim. This Article argued that plaintiffs can rely upon the use of
statistical sampling to recover the funds wrongfully retained
because Subsection G no longer contains a requirement tying
retention of funds to any initial false claim to obtain the funds in
the first instance or to use any false record or statement to retain
them. It also provided an example of how this provision works,
followed by a restatement of the law and procedures for the 2009
amendment to Subsection G. In sum, Congress not only closed a
significant loophole, but it also gave the government a new tool to
help win the war on fraud against the government. This Article
provides a comprehensive framework to guide courts and
practitioners when applying the 2009 version of Section
3729(a)(1)(G) to the cases before them.
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